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Dynamic Efficiency, the Riskless Rate,
and Debt Ponzi Games under
Uncertainty
Abstract
In a dynamically efficient economy, can a government roll its debt forever
and avoid the need to raise taxes? In a series of examples of economies with
zero growth, this paper shows that such Ponzi games may be infeasible even
when the average rate of return on bonds is negative, and may be feasible even
when the average rate of return on bonds is positive. The paper then reveals
the structure which underlies these examples.
The average realized real rate of return on government debt for major
OECD countries over the last 30 years has been smaller than the growth
rate. Does this imply that governments can play a Ponzi debt game, rolling
over their debt without ever increasing taxes?
If only economies were both nonstochastic and in steady state, the answer
to this question would be a simple one. All interest rates would be the same,
and if the interest rate were less than the growth rate, the economy would
be dynamically ineﬃcient. In this case, the government could issue debt and
roll it over forever, never increasing taxes, and covering interest payments
by new debt issues. Debt would grow at the interest rate, but the ratio of
debt to GNP would eventually tend to zero. Such a policy would crowd out
the excessive capital accumulation characteristic of dynamically ineﬃcient
economies and, as we also know, it would in general be Pareto improving.1
Actual economies however are stochastic. And in actual economies, there
are many diﬀerent interest rates, some which are on average above the growth
rate, some which are below. It has been shown in particular that stochastic
economies may be dynamically eﬃcient while having an average riskless real
rate below the growth rate.2 But this brings us back, with an additional twist,
to our initial question. In dynamically eﬃcient economies (i.e., in economies
that are not plagued by capital overaccumulation), can governments issue
and roll over riskless debt, and thus play a Ponzi debt game? This is the
issue we take up in this paper.
Our paper is constructed using the Socratic method. This means two
things. First, that our objective in this paper is not to derive new theoretical
results on dynamic eﬃciency and Ponzi games. Instead, we explicitly and
unabashedly rely on existing theoretical results (most often developed in
contexts quite diﬀerent from ours) to study an issue— the feasibility of Ponzi
debt games in dynamically eﬃcient economies with low safe interest rates—
that often leaves macroeconomists somewhat baﬄed. Second, that we use an
unorthodox exposition style. Instead of proceeding from the general to the
particular, we rely on a series of simple, but increasingly richer, examples
to clear up common misconceptions on Ponzi games in stochastic economies.
1These results require various conditions, both technical and substantive, to be satisﬁed.
One such substantive condition is that the interest rate be equal to the social marginal
product of capital, an assumption which fails for example if there are external returns to
capital. For an analysis of dynamic eﬃciency and Ponzi games in an endogenous growth
model with external returns to capital, see Saint-Paul (1992).
2See Abel, Mankiw, Summers and Zeckhauser (1989).
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We use these examples to move from the speciﬁc to the general, and to reveal
the theoretical structure that we need to understand when and why Ponzi
games can exist in dynamically eﬃcient economies under uncertainty.
Sections 1 to 4 of the paper present our four examples. All share the
following features. First, all characterize economies which are subject to
technological shocks and thus to uncertainty, so that assets with diﬀerent
risk characteristics have diﬀerent rates of return. Second, all characterize
overlapping generation economies with capital accumulation, thus economies
for which capital overaccumulation—dynamic ineﬃciency— is not ruled out a
priori. But, third, in each case, we choose, relying on the criterion derived by
Zilcha (1991), underlying taste and technology parameters such the economy
is actually dynamically eﬃcient. In each of these economies, we then ask what
would happen to the debt-to-GNP ratio if the government were to issue debt
and roll it over time, issuing new debt to pay interest on the existing debt.
And each of the four examples gives us a very diﬀerent answer.
In our ﬁrst example, the average riskless rate is negative; nevertheless, the
expected value of the debt-to-GNP ratio under a rollover strategy explodes,
and thus the government cannot play a debt Ponzi game. In the second, the
average riskless rate is again negative, and, furthermore, the expected value
of the debt-to-GNP ratio under rollover goes to zero. But the fact that a
Ponzi game appears viable in expected value does not imply that it is feasible.
Indeed, in this example, with strictly positive probability, debt rollover leads
to an arbitrarily large value of the debt-to-GNP ratio and is thus again
infeasible. By then, the reader may suspect that dynamic eﬃciency rules out
Ponzi games, no matter what the behavior of the average riskless rate may
be. But the last two examples show this guess to be wrong. In our third
example, the riskless rate is always negative and under a Ponzi debt game,
the debt-to-GNP ratio goes to zero with certainty, so that rollover is indeed
feasible. Our fourth example oﬀers a nearly perfect counterpoint to the ﬁrst.
In that example the average riskless rate is positive; yet by issuing and rolling
over two-period bonds, the government can still play a Ponzi debt game. . .
We spend section 5 of the paper to reveal the structure behind the results,
to explain why Ponzi games are feasible in the last two examples but not in
the ﬁrst two, and to acknowledge our many debts to the literature up to 1990,
when this paper was ﬁrst written. The literature on debt Ponzi games has
made much progress since then (in the direction pointed out by this paper!):
the last section of the paper reviews these contributions.
We do not want to give the answers away in the introduction. For the
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busy reader, they are restated in the conclusion.
1 A ﬁrst example: a Diamond model with
logarithmic preferences
Our ﬁrst example is a straightforward extension of the Diamond (1965) model
to uncertainty.3 Consider an overlapping generation economy in which two-
period consumers inelastically supply one unit of labor when young and retire
when old, and in which population is constant and normalized to one.4 As-
sume that consumers have time- and state-additive logarithmic preferences.
An individual representative of the generation born at time t therefore max-
imizes
(1− β) lnC1,t + β Et lnC2,t+1 (1.1)
subject to
C1t + Kt+1 = Wt, (1.2)
C2,t+1 = Rt+1Kt+1, (1.3)
where C1,t and C2,t+1 denote ﬁrst and second period consumptions of an
individual born at t, Wt and Rt the wage and capital rental rates at t, Kt
the capital stock at t, and the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) measures subjective
time preference.
Output is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology. Output at
time t is given by:
Yt = ΥtK
α
t , (1.4)
where Kt denotes capital per worker at time t, and α ∈ (0, 1) the constant
share of capital in output. The logarithm of the productivity shock Υ is
assumed to be independently and identically normally distributed, with mean
zero and variance σ2. Capital fully depreciates in production.
3This model is by now standard. See for example Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
4We shall throughout consider economies with no growth. Introducing nonstochastic
population or productivity growth would be straightforward, and only complicate notation.
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1.1 Equilibrium capital accumulation and dynamic ef-
ﬁciency
Solving for consumption from utility maximization, and replacing wages and
rental rates by their values from proﬁt maximization, gives:
Kt+1 = (1− α)βΥtKαt , (1.5)
C1,t = (1− β)(1− α)ΥtKαt , (1.6)
C2,t = αΥtK
α
t . (1.7)
Note—this will be relevant later—that, at any time t, the consumptions of
the young and the old are perfectly correlated. Our interest for the moment
is however in the behavior of capital. Denote, hereafter, the logarithm of an
uppercase variable by its lowercase counterpart. We then have
kt+1 = ln[(1− α)β] + αkt + υt. (1.8)
And the behavior of output is given by
yt = α ln[(1− α)β] + αyt−1 + υt. (1.9)
Capital accumulation leads to serial correlation of capital and output in re-
sponse to white noise shocks.
We can now ask under what parameter values this economy is dynamically
eﬃcient. The natural extension of the aggregative Cass (1972) dynamic eﬃ-
ciency criterion under certainty is that the economy is dynamically eﬃcient
if there does not exist another feasible sequence of capital which provides at
least as much aggregate consumption at all dates and in all states, and strictly
higher aggregate consumption in at least one date or state. Zilcha (1991) has
derived a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the eﬃciency of stationary
economies such as the one we consider. In this economy with constant pop-
ulation, the condition is that unconditional expectation of the logarithm of
the gross marginal product of capital, E rt, be nonnegative. Here,
E rt = lnα + (α− 1) E kt = ln
[
α
(1− α)β
]
, (1.10)
so that the economy is dynamically eﬃcient if and only if
θ ≡ α
(1− α)β − 1 ≥ 0. (1.11)
4 Advances in Macroeconomics Vol. 1 [2001], No. 2, Article 3
In the rest of this section, we assume that condition (1.11) is satisﬁed and
that the economy is dynamically eﬃcient.5 We now turn to the determination
of the riskless rate.
1.2 The riskless rate
The equilibrium riskfree rate of return Rft+1 on a safe one-period bond (which
pays one unit of the consumption good in every state at date t + 1) satisﬁes
the ﬁrst-order condition for utility maximization:
(1− β)C−11,t = βRft+1 Et C−12,t+1, (1.12)
Evaluating the equilibrium risk free rate at a zero net supply of bonds, and
thus replacing ﬁrst- and second-period consumption in (1.12) by their values
from equations (1.6) and (1.7), we get
Rft+1 =
1
Et Υ
−1
t+1
αKα−1t+1 , (1.13)
which, using our distributional assumptions about υ, implies that
rft+1 = lnα + (α− 1)kt+1 − σ2/2. (1.14)
Using (1.5), (1.14) and (1.11), the unconditional mean and variance of
the logarithm of the riskfree rate are thus given by
E rft+1 = ln(1 + θ)− σ2/2, (1.15)
Var rft+1 =
1− α
1 + α
σ2, (1.16)
so that, ﬁnally,
ERft+1 = (1 + θ) e
−ασ2/(1+α) . (1.17)
Were there no uncertainty, the net riskless rate would be equal to θ, and
thus would be positive under dynamic eﬃciency. But if the variance of the
technological shocks is large enough, the average gross riskless rate under
uncertainty may be less than one, and the net rate may be negative.
5Note that the condition for dynamic eﬃciency of Abel et al. (1989)—which, being a
suﬃcient condition, is often not conclusive in particular models—is satisﬁed here. Gross
proﬁts, RtKt = αΥtKαt , exceed gross investment, Kt+1 = β(1−α)ΥtKαt , at all dates and
in all states if and only if α ≥ β(1− α), i.e., if and only if θ ≥ 0.
5Blanchard and Weil: Dynamic Efficiency, the Riskless Rate, and Debt Ponzi Games
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002
1.3 Debt Ponzi games
Assume that the underlying parameters are such that the economy is dy-
namically eﬃcient and that the average net riskless rate is negative. Does
the average negative riskless rate imply that the government can roll its debt
forever?
Our strategy in assessing whether or not Ponzi debt games are feasible in
each of our examples will be to characterize the behavior of debt using the
interest rates corresponding to a zero net supply of debt, thus corresponding
to the case where consumption and capital dynamics are given by (1.5) to
(1.7). If we can show that Ponzi games are not feasible under such interest
rates, this will a fortiori be true were we to do the same exercise at the
interest rates corresponding to a positive supply of debt (an exercise however
considerably more diﬃcult analytically): under our assumption on the utility
function which implies that saving is a constant fraction of labor income,
Ponzi games crowd out capital accumulation (see Weil (1987)) and thus raise,
ceteris paribus, all interest rates. If instead we can show that Ponzi games
are feasible under such interest rates, that the debt-to-GNP ratio implodes
over time under rollover, then this will remain true if the government issues
a small enough amount of debt at time 0.
Let B0 be the amount of one-period riskless bonds issued at time 0. Then,
under a rollover strategy, the debt-to-GNP ratio at time t follows
Bt/Yt = (R
f
t . . . R
f
1)B0/Yt, (1.18)
= [Rft /(Yt/Yt−1)] . . . [R
f
1/(Y1/Y0)](B0/Y0). (1.19)
Using the characterization of output and the riskless rate given in equations
(1.9) and (1.14), this implies:
bt − yt = (b0 − y0) + t[ln(1 + θ)− σ2/2]−
t∑
s=1
υs. (1.20)
The logarithm of the debt-to-GNP ratio follows a random walk with drift,
with innovations equal to the technological shocks. This in turn implies that
the expected value of the debt-to-GNP ratio follows:
E[Bt/Yt] = [B0/Y0](1 + θ)
t. (1.21)
Thus, the behavior of the expected debt-to-GNP ratio is simple: it grows
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at rate θ, irrespective of the value of the average riskless rate.6 This implies
that a Ponzi game is not feasible: in expectation, debt becomes larger than
saving, which is proportional to GNP—an impossibility.
What is at work here is Jensen’s inequality. As is clear from equation
(1.14), the riskless rate from t to t+1 is known at time t, but varies stochas-
tically through time. What matters for the behavior of debt is the expec-
tation of the product of the riskless rates, not the product of the expected
riskless rates. This is why a negative average riskless rate is consistent with
an exploding expected debt-to-GNP ratio.7
This ﬁrst example gives a clear warning. An economy may have an av-
erage negative riskless rate (or, if we were to allow for growth, an average
riskless rate below the average growth rate) but this does not imply that the
government can rollover debt forever; in this example, under the condition
that the economy is dynamically eﬃcient, the expected debt-to-GNP ratio
grows at a rate which is necessarily positive, regardless of the riskless rate.
One may ask however what would happen if people were more risk averse
than implied by logarithmic utility. Wouldn’t this further decrease the aver-
age riskless rate and reintroduce room for a Ponzi game? We take the issue
up in the next example.
2 A second example: Allowing for more risk
aversion
In this example, we maintain the assumption that consumers still have log-
arithmic intertemporal preferences, but no longer restrict their coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion to equal unity. The rationale for adopting this spec-
iﬁcation is that, while the assumption of a unit elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is necessary to preserve the simplicity of the model, the ability
to choose the degree of risk aversion allows us to examine the comparative
dynamic eﬀects of increased risk aversion on equilibrium returns and on the
asymptotic rate of growth of debt Ponzi games.
6The behavior of debt itself—as opposed to the debt-to-GNP ratio—is more complex.
If the average riskless rate is negative, expected debt initially decreases. Asymptotically
however, it also grows at rate θ.
7A similar point has been made in Galli and Giavazzi (1992) in the context of a Ramsey
economy.
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Thus, following Selden (1978) and Weil (1990), we assume that consumers
now maximize
(1− β) lnC1,t + β ln[Et C1−γ2,t+1]1/(1−γ), (2.1)
where γ > 0 (γ = 1) is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion.8
2.1 Equilibrium capital accumulation and dynamic ef-
ﬁciency
Because of the assumption of logarithmic intertemporal preferences, con-
sumers choose to save a constant fraction β of their lifetime wealth regardless
of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion: attitudes towards risk are irrelevant
for consumption and savings decisions when income and substitution eﬀects
cancel each other out. As a consequence, the equilibrium consumption al-
location and capital accumulation process are the same as in the previous
section, and the condition for dynamic eﬃciency is still, as in (1.11), θ ≥ 0.
2.2 The riskless rate
While the value of γ does not matter for capital accumulation when in-
tertemporal preferences are logarithmic, attitudes towards risk are of course
a crucial determinant of the implicit riskless interest rate. Adapting the ar-
gument in the previous section, the equilibrium gross return on a safe claim
on consumption at t + 1 must satisfy
1− β
C1,t
= βRf,γt+1
Et C
−γ
2,t+1
Et C
1−γ
2,t+1
, (2.2)
where the notation Rf,γt+1 is adopted to highlight the dependence of the riskless
rate on γ.
Evaluating this expression along the no debt path, one ﬁnds that:
Rf,γt+1 =
Et Υ
1−γ
t+1
Et Υ
−γ
t+1
αKα−1t+1 . (2.3)
8Note that [Et C
1−γ
2,t+1]
1/(1−γ) is simply the certainty equivalent of second period con-
sumption for an individual with constant relative risk aversion γ. One can also verify,
using L’Hospital’s rule, that the preferences represented in (2.1) reduce to the time- and
state- additive logarithmic form in (1.1) when γ → 1.
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Under the lognormality assumption, it follows that:
Rf,γt+1 = R
f,1
t+1 e
(1−γ)σ2 , (2.4)
where Rf,1t+1 is the riskless rate for the unit risk aversion case computed (in
logarithmic form) in (1.14).
As a consequence,
ERf,γt+1 = ER
f,1
t+1 e
(1−γ)σ2
= (1 + θ) e[−(α/(1+α))]σ
2
e[(1−γ)]σ
2
. (2.5)
The eﬀect of increased risk aversion is thus to decrease proportionately the
riskless rate by the same factor in all states and at all dates. For a given
variance of productivity shocks, the average net riskless rate can be very
negative if agents are very risk averse.
2.3 Debt Ponzi games
Following the same logic as in the previous section, we derive the behavior
of the debt-to-GNP ratio under rollover, using the processes for the riskless
rate and for output characterized above. We get that the logarithm of the
debt-to-GNP ratio at time t under Ponzi ﬁnance follows:
bt − yt = (b0 − y0) + t[ln(1 + θ) + (1− 2γ)σ2/2]−
t∑
s=1
υs. (2.6)
As before, the debt-to-GNP ratio follows a random walk with drift. However,
for a given variance of shocks, the drift may now be arbitrarily large and
negative. Equation (2.6) in turn implies:
E[Bt/Yt] = [B0/Y0](1 + θ)
t e(1−γ)σ
2t . (2.7)
The unconditional expected debt-to-GNP ratio thus grows (or de-
clines. . . ) at the constant rate (1 + θ) e(1−γ)σ
2
. Provided that agents are
suﬃciently risk averse, dynamic eﬃciency (θ ≥ 0) need not imply an ex-
ploding expected debt-to-GNP ratio under rollover. So is this Ponzi game
feasible? The answer is no. It is not enough that the expected value of the
ratio go to zero. What is required is that the Ponzi game be feasible in all
states.9 Equation (2.6) shows that the logarithm of the debt-to-GNP ratio
9This is indeed the main point raised by Bohn (1995).
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follows a random walk with drift. It follows that the debt to GNP ratio will
exceed any ﬁnite limit, such as the ratio of saving to GNP, with probability 1
if the expected debt-to-GNP ratio rises, and with positive probability if the
expected debt to GNP ratio decreases. Thus, with strictly positive probabil-
ity, even if the expected debt to GNP ratio goes to zero, the Ponzi game will
prove infeasible.
This second example shows that, in an economy which is dynamically
eﬃcient, the average riskless rate may be negative, the debt-to-GNP ratio
may go to zero in expected value under rollover, and yet there is a strictly
positive probability that the Ponzi game cannot be played forever. The
proximate cause of the result is that, in this example, the debt-to-GNP ratio
follows a random walk with drift: no matter how small the initial amount of
debt issued, there is a positive probability that the (nonstationary) debt-to-
GNP ratio eventually exceeds some given bound, and in particular the wage
income of the young—an event inconsistent with equilibrium. This naturally
raises another question. Could the government issue bonds with diﬀerent risk
characteristics so that, under some conditions, the debt to GNP ratio would
instead be stationary around a mean and the probability that it reaches some
critical value be made arbitrarily small or even zero? We defer the question
to Section 6 below; there we shall show that the answer is no.
3 A third example: An economy with
stochastic storage
Assume that, as in our ﬁrst example, consumers have time- and state-additive
logarithmic preferences. Assume, however, that the technology is diﬀerent.
People born at time t receive a nonstochastic ﬁrst period endowment W > 0,
and have access to a stochastic constant returns to scale storage technology
with random gross rate of return R˜t+1.
10 The logarithm of R˜t is assumed to
be identically and independently distributed with mean µ and variance σ2.
Using the Zilcha criterion, this economy is dynamically eﬃcient if and
only if E ln R˜t = µ ≥ 0.11
10This model is also standard. It was used by Koda (1984) to study the existence of
ﬁat currency equilibria, and was more recently analyzed by Gale (1990) in the context of
public debt. A similar model was also used by Summers (1984).
11Formally, our example, which has constant returns to storage does not satisfy the con-
cavity conditions required for the Zilcha criterion to apply. An alternative formalization,
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Under those assumptions, the consumption of the young, the consumption
of the old and the capital stock are given by:
C1t = (1− β)W, (3.1)
C2t = βR˜tW, (3.2)
Kt = βW. (3.3)
Because the endowment is nonstochastic, the consumption of the young
and capital accumulation are also nonstochastic. Because storage is stochas-
tic, the consumption of the old is stochastic, and independently and identi-
cally distributed over time. In contrast to the previous examples, the con-
sumption of young and old are not perfectly correlated, a point to which we
shall return below.
Having characterized consumption, we can derive the implicit equilibrium
rate of return on a one-period bond. From the ﬁrst order conditions of the
consumer, it is given by:
Rf =
1
E R˜−1
= eµ−σ
2/2 . (3.4)
Thus the rate of return on one-period bonds is also nonstochastic. It may
well be negative if the variance of R˜ is suﬃciently large.12 Since both the
ﬁrst-period endowment and the riskless rate are constant, a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the feasibility of issuing at least a small quantity of
debt and rolling it over is simply
Rf < 1. (3.5)
Thus, in sharp contrast to our previous examples, in this dynamically
eﬃcient economy, debt Ponzi games may actually be feasible. And the risk-
less rate plays a crucial role in determining the feasibility of Ponzi ﬁnance.
Ponzi ﬁnance is feasible if and only if the net riskless rate is negative.13 This
suggests that, after all, the riskless rate may be an important variable in
assessing whether Ponzi ﬁnance is feasible or not. The last example shows
that this guess would also be wrong.
which satisﬁes those conditions, and has the same implications for the existence of debt
rollover is one where depreciation is stochastic so that output is produced according to
Yt = Ktα − δKt where δ is a random variable.
12Or, if we had used the preferences of section 2, if consumers are suﬃciently risk averse.
13This result is closely related to Koda’s (1984) characterization in this model of the
existence of monetary equilibria with constant money supply.
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4 A fourth example: Serially correlated re-
turns in storage
We consider the same storage economy, but now allow for serially correlated
returns on storage.14 The reason for doing this will be clear later. More
speciﬁcally, we assume that the rate of return on storage follows a geometric
MA(1) process:
Rt+1 = 
ρ
t t+1, (4.1)
where the logarithm of  is identically and independently distributed with
mean µ and variance σ2, and with ρ ≥ −1.
From Zilcha’s criterion, taking the logarithm and the unconditional ex-
pectation of both sides of (4.1), this economy is dynamically eﬃcient if and
only if
E lnRt = (1 + ρ) E ln  ≥ 0, (4.2)
or, equivalently, if and only if µ ≥ 0.
Consider now the following debt Ponzi game. At time 0, the government
issues debt in the form of two-period bonds, titles to one unit of good two
periods later. At time 1, the government buys back what are now one-period
bonds, and pays with the proceeds of new issues of two-period bonds, and so
on. To characterize the behavior of debt under this scheme, we ﬁrst determine
the equilibrium prices of one- and two-period bonds.
The price at time t of a two-period bond, issued at t− 1 and maturing at
t + 1, is simply, from the ﬁrst-order condition of the consumers
p1t =
β
1− β Et
{
C1,t
C2,t+1
}
= Et R
−1
t+1
= −ρt E 
−1, (4.3)
Note, for use below, that the average one-period gross riskless rate is given
by E(1/p1t).
15 The average net riskless rate is thus nonnegative if and only
if (E ρ)/(E −1) ≥ 1, or equivalently, µ− (1− ρ)σ2/2 ≥ 0.
Notice, also for later use, that, if ρ is positive, the price of a one-period
bond is high when the current rate of return on storage is low16—because a
14This example is a direct application of Gale (1990).
15By arbitrage, the rates of return on one-period bonds, and on old two-period bonds
one year to maturity must be equal.
16Given t−1 , a high t means a low p1t and a high Rt.
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low return on storage today creates the expectation of a low future return.
The price at time t of a newly issued two-period bond is
p2t =
(
β
1− β
)2
Et
{
C1,t
C2,t+1
C1,t+1
C2,t+2
}
= Et(Rt+1Rt+2)
−1
= −ρt E 
−(1+ρ) E −1. (4.4)
Now consider the dynamic behavior of debt (or—trivially—the ratio of
debt to ﬁrst period endowment, as the endowment, W , is constant). At time
t, debt satisﬁes:
p2tBt = p1tBt−1, (4.5)
so that
Bt =
1
E −(1+ρ)
Bt−1. (4.6)
Thus, the rate of growth of the debt is deterministic, and of the same sign
as µ− (1 + ρ)σ2.
Are there parameters such that i) the economy is dynamically eﬃcient,
ii) the average one-period net riskless rate is nonnegative, (iii) debt decreases
or stays constant every period? From our derivations above, it is clear that
the answer is yes. The conditions on µ, ρ and σ2 are that ρ > 0, (1 + ρ)σ2 ≥
µ ≥ (1− ρ)σ2. These conditions are satisﬁed for example by ρ = µ = σ = 1.
Thus, Ponzi ﬁnance using noncontingent two-period bonds is feasible,
although the economy is dynamically eﬃcient and the average one-period
net riskless rate is positive.
5 Dynamic eﬃciency and Pareto-optimality
Why do results diﬀer between the ﬁrst two and the last two examples? Under
uncertainty, overlapping generation models diﬀer from Ramsey economies in
two ways. The ﬁrst is that people have ﬁnite economic horizons. The second
is that markets are incomplete. In all four examples, the condition that
dynamic eﬃciency holds rules out the capital overaccumulation which may
arise from the ﬁrst feature. The diﬀerence between the two sets of examples
comes from the second feature. In the ﬁrst two examples, incomplete markets
do not matter, and thus the equilibrium is Pareto optimal. In the last two,
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they do, and debt is Pareto improving. We consider these propositions in
more detail.
In all four examples, the overlapping generation structure implies that
the young cannot enter insurance contracts with the old so as to share risk
in the ﬁrst period of their life. But in the ﬁrst two, the consumption of the
young and the consumption of the old are perfectly correlated, so that there
is no room anyway for further risk sharing. Indeed, it is easy to check that
the decentralized allocation in our ﬁrst two examples maximizes the following
social welfare function
Et[
∞∑
s=0
(1 + θ)−s((1− β) lnC1,t+s + β Et+s lnC2,t+s+1)] (5.1)
where θ is deﬁned as earlier and is therefore positive under dynamic eﬃciency.
In line with previous literature,17 this means that the market outcome is
Pareto optimal: there is no way to improve the welfare of current generations
without hurting some future generation. Thus the government cannot play
Ponzi games, no matter what the average riskless rate or the expected value
of the debt-to-GNP ratio.
This is not the case in the last two examples. In the third example,
technological uncertainty falls only on the old at time t, while the consump-
tion of the young remains constant. This suggests room for debt to provide
such insurance, and this indeed the case. This has been emphasized by Gale
(1990) who has shown that in the context of that example, the government
can not only issue and rollover debt, but further issue new debt every period
so as to maintain a constant debt-to-endowment ratio. Not only is such a
policy feasible but it is Pareto improving, so long as the amount of debt does
not lead to a positive riskless rate. This can be seen easily. Carrying a con-
stant amount of debt at a negative riskless rate is equivalent to transferring
a constant amount, τ from the young to the old. It is easy to check that the
condition for such a transfer to increase expected utility is that the riskless
rate be negative.18 Put another way, the reason why the government is able
to play a Ponzi game is that bonds provide insurance and require a low rate
of return. (This conclusion is similar to that in Bertocchi (1991), who focuses
on the equivalent phenomenon of bubbles.) The role for noncontingent debt
17See, for instance, Peled (1982), Aiyagari and Peled (1991), or Gottardi (1996).
18The proof is immediate and holds for a general utility function. Expected utility when
an intergenerational transfer of size τ takes place is U = Eu[W −K(τ) − τ, R˜K(τ) + τ ].
Straightforward algebra shows that dU/dτ > 0 as long as Rf < 1.
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to provide insurance may however be quite limited (or not present at all).
This explains the role of the debt in the last example. When returns to stor-
age are positively correlated, a low realization of the rate of return on storage
is associated with a lower riskfree rate next period and thus a high price of
one-period bonds. Thus, issuing two period bonds and buying them back
as one-period bonds provides insurance to the old. The price they get for
their bonds is high when the returns to storage are low. This suggests that
there may be an optimal maturity for bonds, a line that has been explored
by Gale. Indeed, this suggests the issuance of explicitly contingent bonds to
provide the needed insurance. And under those conditions, the government
may well be able to issue and rollover debt.
Should one conclude that Pareto suboptimality is a suﬃcient condition for
the feasibility of debt Ponzi games, for some form of debt? Surely not. Com-
petitive economies may be Pareto suboptimal for reasons that have nothing
to do with inadequate intergenerational transfers. To see this, consider for
example a simple modiﬁcation of our third example. Assume that prefer-
ences and the storage technology facing each individual are the same as in
that example, but that uncertainty is idiosyncratic so that, while the return
on individual storage is uncertain, aggregate storage is not. Assume further
that individual realizations are private information, preventing private con-
tracts that pool away this individual uncertainty from being written. The
lack of intra-generational sharing makes the equilibrium obviously Pareto
suboptimal. Can the government play a Ponzi game? As aggregate variables
are nonstochastic, we can, without loss of generality, look at riskless debt
games. The riskless rate is the same as it was in our example, so that the
condition for Ponzi games to be feasible is again that the average net riskless
rate be negative, namely that µ−σ2/2 ≤ 0. If this condition is not satisﬁed,
if for example, storage is suﬃciently productive, there is no scope for Ponzi
ﬁnance. 19
Should one conclude that Ponzi games, when feasible, are Pareto-
improving? In the four examples considered in this paper the answer is
yes, but this is not true generally, for reasons that have nothing to do with
uncertainty per se but rather with second-best theory. An example is given
by Saint-Paul (1992), who studies an endogenously growing overlapping gen-
19Cass, Okuno and Zilcha (1980) have shown, under certainty, that the often-asserted
connection between the Pareto suboptimality of “nonmonetary” equilibria and the exis-
tence of “monetary” equilibria does not generally hold: their results about ﬁat currency
translate almost directly to debt Ponzi games, and are valid, a fortiori under uncertainty.
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erations economy with a distortion coming from external increasing returns
to capital. In his model, Ponzi games are feasible whenever the private
marginal product of capital falls short of the growth rate (which is itself al-
ways lower than the social rate of return on capital). But a debt Ponzi game
is never Pareto improving: since it crowds out capital accumulation, it lowers
the growth rate, so that eventually the welfare of some future generations is
adversely aﬀected.
6 Subsequent literature
The literature has made much progress since this paper was ﬁrst written in
1990. Authors looking for existence conditions for ﬁat-currency equilibria
(another name for debt Ponzi games) have conﬁrmed the essential themes
of this paper: the irrelevance of the average riskless rate, and the crucial
role of debt Ponzi games in providing intergenerational insurance. Some
papers have gone beyond the territory explored here, and have provided the
necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of monetary equilibria (or
debt Ponzi games) we were unable to derive ten years ago.
Manuelli (1990) shows, in a stochastic overlapping generations exchange
economy (in which the very issue of dynamic productive eﬃciency that pre-
occupied us is moot) that the sign of the expected riskfree interest rate puts
no restriction of the existence of ﬁat currency equilibria. In addition, mone-
tary equilibria, when they exist, often do not look like simple deterministic
transfers from the young to the old, but instead provide partial insurance
between generations. Manuelli (1990) constructs an example in which it is
indeed “this ‘insurance’ aspect that explains the value of money” (p. 278).
All this is of course in direct line, albeit in an exchange economy, with the
message of our four Socratic examples.
Also in a stochastic exchange economy, Chattopadhyay and Gottardi
(1999) provide a necessary and suﬃcient for conditional Pareto optimality.
Closer to our framework, Wang (1993) analyzes the existence and unique-
ness of stationary equilibria in overlapping generations economies with
stochastic production. He does not deal however with dynamic eﬃciency, op-
timality, or Ponzi games. In a stochastic Diamond (1965) economy, Bertocchi
(1994) carefully analyzes safe debt Ponzi games in the dynamically ineﬃcient
case. Using a log-linear stochastic economy with capital similar to our ﬁrst
example, she shows that safe debt might be unable to remove ineﬃciency, be-
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cause of inadequate risk-sharing between generations. Furthermore, Bertoc-
chi and Kehagias (1995) develop a stochastic version of Pontryagin’s maxi-
mum principle for Markov controls which enables them to derive a complete
characterization of Pareto optimality for stochastic economies with capital
based on stochastic multipliers. They emphasize, as we did, that a “careful
distinction between dynamic eﬃciency and Pareto optimality is crucial for
understanding phenomena such as Ponzi games and speculative bubbles...
[E]ven when dynamic eﬃciency obtains, Ponzi games and bubbles are sus-
tainable if they can provide insurance and thus improve, in the Pareto sense,
the allocation of aggregate risk” (pp. 321–322).
This is also the message of Barbie, Hagedorn and Kaul (2000), who gen-
eralize the results of Chattopadhyay and Gottardi (1999) to an economy
with production. They provide a single necessary and suﬃcient condition
for conditional Pareto optimality with dynamically complete markets. This
criterion—which alas eluded us when we wrote our paper— involves check-
ing that a properly weighted sum of inverse contingent prices does not con-
verge over any possible history of the economy. Chattopadhyay and Gottardi
(1999) also show that whenever the competitive equilibrium is Pareto sub-
optimal, Pareto optimality can always be restored by a scheme that closely
resembles a Ponzi game, and rolls over an insurance contract in exchange for
contributions. The lesson that “sophisticated” Ponzi games improve inter-
generational risk sharing is indeed the one taught by our example 4.
Last but not least, Barbie, Hagedorn and Kaul (2001) use data from
the maturity structure of U.S. government debt to argue empirically that
the U.S. is dynamically eﬃcient (this was the gist of the Abel et al. (1989)
paper) but also conditionally Pareto suboptimal. Barbie et al. (2001) con-
clude that there is, therefore, room for a “dynamic ﬁscal policy” to insure
against macroeconomic risks. This policy involves running (sophisticated)
debt Ponzi games in a dynamically eﬃcient economy under uncertainty. . .
7 Conclusion
Arguments as to whether governments can rollover debt are often cast in
terms of a comparison of the average growth rate and average riskless rate.
In a series of examples, we have shown that this may be misleading. The
average riskless rate may be less than the growth rate while Ponzi games are
infeasible, or it may be greater than the growth rate, while Ponzi games are
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feasible.
Turning to the structure underlying those examples, we have shown that,
even in economies in which equilibrium is dynamically eﬃcient, Pareto sub-
optimality may also lead to the feasibility of Ponzi schemes.
In thinking about the implications of Pareto suboptimality, we have fo-
cused in this paper on the suboptimality which comes naturally from the
incompleteness of markets under uncertainty in overlapping generation mod-
els. But there are many other reasons why actual economies may not be
Pareto optima. Missing markets may be missing for reasons ranging from
asymmetric information to transaction costs, leading for a potential role of
public debt, and opening the possibility of Ponzi games.20 Distortions, from
externalities to taxation, may also create wedges between risk adjusted in-
terest rates and the social marginal product of capital.21 Thus, Ponzi games
may be feasible. And if they are, they may—but need not—be Pareto im-
proving.
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